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A recent population-wide study for Germany, where credit lines on current accounts are available to 80 
percent of the population, finds that overdraft debt is more likely for people who give intuitive but incorrect 
answers on a cognitive reflection test. This suggests those consumers in debt have poorer cognitive 
reflection and, thus, lack of self control. The Germany study finds that “surprisingly, the level of income 
does not play a central role.” Here we discriminate the consumers in terms of their income by considering 
two experiments. In the first (pilot) experiment we do not discriminate consumers in terms of income and, 
as result, replicate the Germany study. In a follow-up experiment, which assembles a high-quality sample 
of high-income consumers, we find debt can no longer be explained by poor cognitive reflection. 
Apparently, high-income consumers treat debt as mere leverage, as companies do. 
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Most cognitive psychologists currently favor a dual-system approach to higher 
cognition processes [1] [2]. Two systems compete for control of our inferences and 
actions. “System 1” refers to a large set of subsystems that operate autonomously in 
response to their own triggering stimuli and are not under control of the analytic 
processing system, which is called “System 2.” The subsystems of System 1 include input 
modules related to specific-domain knowledge. Each module is evolutionarily adapted 
for solving a different problem so that System 1 is similar to a Swiss army knife. 
However, not all modules are inate and some are the result of overpractice. Intuitive 
decisions are fast and automatic, and use System 1. Modular input processes (System 1) 
feed information to the analytic processing system (System 2), which is nonmodular and 
responsible for abstract reasoning and the use of hypotheses. System 2 is deliberative but 
slow as it is limited by its working memory capability. Automatic decisions work well 
most of the time, but they also lead to predictable biases and heuristics (simple procedures 
that help find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions) [3]. 
System 1 is evolutionarily older and we share it with other animals. System 2 is 
evolutionarily more recent and distinctively human. The early evolution of System 1 
suggests its logic is related to an “evolutionary rationality” from the gene’s-eye view, 
while the logic of the lately evolved System 2 refers to the rationality of the individual 
vehicle who carries the genes [4]. Evolutionary psychologists like to show that many 
decisions based on System 1 that seem irrational from the vehicle perspective ultimately 
have an evolutionary logic from the gene’s-eye view [5]. Put another way, while the 
vehicle maximizes utility, the genome profits from maximizing inclusive fitness. The late 
emergence of System 2 occurred under a lapse of direct genetic control. As the world 
became more complex to predict, in particular because of the need for interpersonal 
interaction, natural selection favored a general goal system (System 2) in addition to the 
domain-specific modules (System 1). In a useful anthropomorphic description, “The 
genes gave up direct control and instead said (metaphorically, by the types of phenotypic 
effects that they created) ‘things will be changing too fast out there, brain, for us to tell 
you exactly what to do—you just go ahead and do what you think is best given the general 
goals (survival, sexual reproduction) that we have inserted’” [4]. One dramatic 
consequence was that this allowed individuals to alternatively pursue their own objectives 
and not exclusively those of their genes [4]. This potential conflict of interests between 
genes and their vehicles can possibly be the basis of the human psychology of self-
deception [6]. 
 A simple test—the cognitive reflection test (CRT)—can gauge how individuals 
differ in cognitive ability [7] in terms of the relative powers of their Systems 1 and 2. 
Individuals scoring higher on the CRT show enhanced ability for using their System 2 to 
override System 1, whenever this is necessary to prevent heuristics and biases. The CRT 
is correlated with other measures of cognitive ability. However, it is not an IQ test. 
Because it measures the ability to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind 
(cognitive reflection), it is arguably better than the other measures in terms of predicting 
decision making [7] [8]. After all, better decision making depends more on broad 
rationality (which is what the CRT actually tracks) than on instrumental rationality or 
algorithmic intelligence (which is what conventional measures of intelligence assess) [4]. 
Thus, the CRT may successfully predict, for example, risk attitudes and intertemporal 
preferences [7]. 
 Males score significantly higher on the CRT than females do [8]. Males are more 
likely to reflect on their answers and less inclined to go with their intuitive responses. 
Females are more automatic. This brings them advantages in those tasks that require 
domain-specific knowledge, although it also exposes them more to predictable biases and 
heuristics, especially in context-free environments. In this study, we replicate the finding 
that males score higher on the CRT. 
 There is a large volume of literature linking analytic processing to inhibitory 
control [9]-[16]. This means an individual ability to use his or her System 2 to override 
System 1 can be associated with his or her self-control [17]-[19]. System 2 is in charge 
of self-control. In particular, self-control has been linked to financial debt. Self-control 
considerations play a role in individuals’ indebtedness and its consequent repayment 
difficulties [20]. When self-control reflects dynamically inconsistent preferences, 
overextending debt occurs because the availability of credit increases consumers’ 
perceived liquidity and thus spending, irrespective of their budget constraints [21]. 
Moreover, when consumers make decisions based on the immediately available 
resources, they exhibit a bias in how they perceive interest rates. They tend to 
underestimate the interest rates associated with a loan principal and payment stream 
because of their inability to perceive changes in exponential series [22]. Self-control 
problems are a possible explanation for high levels of credit card borrowing [23]-[26], 
and are indeed related to time inconsistent preferences [25] [27]. 
In a study that considers data for Germany [28], where credit lines on current 
accounts are available to 80 percent of the population, excessive usage of costly credit 
lines is more likely for people who give intuitive but incorrect answers on the CRT. This 
suggests consumers in overdraft debt have poor cognitive reflection and then a lack of 
self control. Here, we ask whether such a result is nuanced as one considers the distinction 
between low-income and high-income consumers. Arguably, one should expect high-
income consumers to be only a tiny minority in the population-wide Germany study. 
Thus, we set up two experiments. First, one pilot experiment that is similar to the 
Germany study in that income is not an issue. The pilot experiment is able to replicate the 
finding of the Germany study, that is, consumer indebtness is related to lack of self 
control. Secondly, we also devise a follow-up experiment to assess how this result is 
nuanced by the effect of income. We purposefully assemble a sample of high-income 
consumers and apply the CRT to them. Then we assess performance on the CRT by 
considering both those in debt and those who are debt free. Based on CRT performance, 
we find the reason for debt of high-income consumers is unlikely to be related to a lack 
of self control. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
 
Three simple questions made up the cognitive reflection test [7]. They are 





1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost? 
 _____ cents 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? 
_____ minutes 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 




The correct answers are 5, 5 and 47 respectively. The intuitive answer that springs 
quickly to mind in question 1 is “10 cents.” However, this is wrong. The difference 
between $1.00 and 10 cents is only 90 cents, not $1.00 as the problem stipulates. Let x  
be the ball cost. Then, (1.00 ) 1.10 0.05x x x     . The automatic answer to question 
2 is 100. This is wrong because taking the first sentence and multiplying the number of 
machines (5) by 20, it would take the same 5 minutes to make 100 widgets. In question 
3, the intuitive answer is 24. This is also wrong. Let exponential 
nd  represent the function 
where n  is the number of days it takes the patch to cover the entire lake. Thus, half is 
always 1n  and the patch will cover half the lake in 48 1 47   days. In both 
experiments we devise here, we ask the participants to respond to the three questions 
above in less than 30 seconds to make sure an automatic choice is given. We also ask the 
participants whether he or she already knew one or all of the three questions. If one 
participant knew at least one question, he or she was removed from the sample in the pilot 
experiment. If someone reported to know at least one of the questions in the follow-up 
experiment, we then asked him or her to answer the alternative CRT [29] as follows. 
 
 
 CRT (alternative questions) 
 
4. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 
days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together?  
_____ days. 
[Correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9 days] 
 
5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students 
are in the class? 
______ students. 
   [Correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30 students] 
 
6. A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. 
How much has he made? 
 _____ dollars. 
   [Correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10] 
 
Frederick observes that the questions on the CRT are easy because their solutions 
are easily understood when explained [7]. However, reaching one correct answer requires 
overriding an erroneous answer that springs impulsively to mind. In his own study, 
Frederick reports that those who answered “10 cents” to Question 1 also estimated that 
92 percent of people would correctly solve it, whereas those who answered “5 cents” 
estimated that 62 percent would. In other words, those who performed poorly were also 
those overconfident. 
In the pilot experiment, the experimenter (CV) sent Google Docs questionnaires 
containing the CRT (Questions 1 to 3 above) and further questions related to information 
on the participant’s age, gender, whether he or she had debt, and whether he or she had 
been using a bank’s overdraft service. This service is called “special check” and is 
provided by Brazilian banks exclusively for invididual customers, not for companies. The 
amount overdrawn is within an authorized overdraft limit, and then interest is normally 
charged at an agreed rate. The questionnaires were sent via the Internet (through email 
messages and Facebook postings) to undergraduates from the Federal University of Santa 
Catarina (located at Florianopolis in southern Brazil) and to the general public possibly 
from the Florianopolis area and possibly unrelated to the university. In total, 126 
respondents participated in this pilot experiment. Thus, each respondent provided his or 
her answers to the questionnaire suposedly through desktopts, laptops and smartphones. 
The questionnaires were sent during three different time spans in 2014: the beginning of 
October; October 27 and 28; and November 3 and 4. 
 In the end, we considered only 109 participants from the initial 126 respondents 
of the pilot experiment. Fifteen failed to answer one of the CRT questions within 30 
seconds and two already knew at least one of the first set of CRT questions (1 to 3). 
 As for the follow-up experiment, we took advantage of the fact that a different 
experimenter (AC) was also a personal banker in a large private bank in Brazil. She deals 
exclusively with high-income customers (with monthly earnings greater than 10,000 
Brazilian real). Questionnaires considering questions similar to the pilot experiment were 
created using Eval & Go (www.evalandgo.com/) and sent to customers who were 
previously approached by the experimenter on a one-to-one basis. She received oral 
consents from the part of the participants. The link for the questionnaires sent to each 
customer could be accessed through desktops, laptops, tablets or smartphones. Eval & Go 
allowed for a chronometer to be set for each of the CRT questions. After 30 seconds, one 
page was closed and participants were redirected to the next. The link for the 
questionnaires were sent through messages using email, Facebook, Linkedin and 
WhatsApp. Only 13 participants knew the original questions of the CRT (1-3) and thus 
responded to the alternative CRT (4-7). 
 The questionnaires were sent from March 30, 2016 to April 29, 2016. In total, 329 
customers participated, 212 completed the questionnaires, but only 149 provided valid 




 Table 1 shows the number of scores 0, 1, 2 or 3 on the CRT distinguished by 
gender for the pilot experiment. Males score higher, a result that replicates Frederick’s 
results [7]. A chi-square value of 25.106 calculated using the appropriate degrees of 
freedom (three) is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). We also compute a 
correlation coefficient. Because the involved variables refer to counts (scores), Pearson’s 
rho more powerfully detects any hidden dependence. We find a negative Pearson’s linear 
correlation, which confirms females score lower. 
 
Table 1. Pilot experiment: CRT scores, by gender 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Gender 0 1 2 3 
Male48 22.9211 14.587 37.5018 25.0012 
Female61 44.2627 39.3424 11.477 4.923 
Notes:  
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents  
(2) 
2(3) 25.106;  -value 0.001p    ( Fisher's exact -value 0.001p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.41;  -value 0.001p     
 
 Table 2 shows the scores for the pilot experiment considering reports of debt 
whithout discriminating the exact type of debt involved. A pattern emerges (Figure 1). 
Those participants who report to have any type of debt show relatively poorer cognitive 
performance than those with no debt. Although the chi-square test is nonsignificant, a 
significant, negative correlation is found between the variables CRT and indiscriminate 
debt. 
 
Table 2. Pilot experiment: CRT scores, by indiscriminate debt 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
In debt? 0 1 2 3 
Yes56 41.0723 32.1418 17.8510 8.935 
No53 28.3015 24.5313 28.3015 18.8710 
Notes:  
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents  
(2) 
2(3) 5.078;  -value 0.166p    ( Fisher's exact -value 0.173p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.20; -value 0.032p     
 
 
Figure 1. Pilot experiment: CRT scores and indiscriminate debt. Those in debt (negatively sloped curve) 
perform poorly relative to those who are debt free (flat curve). 
 
 As for CRT and overdraft debt, although a negative correlation is found, it is 
nonsignificant. This result may be related to the fact that a non-negligible part of the 
sample in this pilot experiment is made up of students with bank accounts that do not 
allow for overdraft facilities. 
 
Table 3. Pilot experiment: CRT scores, by overdraft debt 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Overdraft? 0 1 2 3 
Yes42 33.3314 30.9513 26.1911 9.524 
No37 32.4312 24.329 18.927 24.329 
Notes:  
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents 
(2) 
2(3) 3.390; -value 0.335p   ( Fisher's exact -value 0.345p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.11; -value 0.346p     
 
 Overall, our pilot experiment gives support to the Germany study [28]. People in 
debt are more likely to have poor cognitive reflection in that they tend to give intuitive 
but incorrect answers on the CRT. The Germany study refers to the overdraft type of debt. 
Our pilot experiment considers reports of indiscriminate debt in addition. Though 
overdraft debt in our sample seems to follow the same pattern as indiscriminate debt does, 
the result for overdraft debt is nonsignificant. As in our pilot experiment, the Germany 
study does not discriminate consumers in terms of income. Arguably, in the massive 
database of the Germany study one should expect only a tiny minority of high-income 
consumers. As observed, this fact prompted us to conceive a follow-up experiment by 
purposefully assembling a sample of high-income consumers. 
 Table 4 shows the number of scores 0, 1, 2 or 3 on the CRT distinguished by 
gender in the follow-up experiment. As expected, males score higher again. 
  
Table 4. Follow-up experiment: CRT scores, by gender 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
Gender 0 1 2 3 
Male94 54.2851 29.7928 12.7712 3.193 
Female55 74.5541 16.369 9.095 0.000 
Notes: 
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents 
(2) 
2(3) 6.997; -value 0.072p    ( Fisher's exact -value 0.076p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.19; -value 0.021p     
 
 Table 5 shows the scores considering reports of indiscriminate debt in the follow-
up experiment. The pattern seen in Figure 1 for the pilot experiment vanishes. Those 
participants who report to have any type of debt do not show relatively poorer cognitive 
performance than those who are debt free. Unfortunately, this result is nonsignificant. 
 
Table 5. Folow-up experiment: CRT scores, by indiscriminate debt 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
In debt? 0 1 2 3 
Yes29 65.5219 20.696 13.804 0.000 
No120 60.8373 25.8331 10.8313 2.503 
Notes:  
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents  
(2) 
2(3) 1.236; -value 0.744p    ( Fisher's exact -value 0.888p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.03; -value 0.678p     
 
 
Figure 2. Follow-up experiment: CRT scores and indiscriminate debt. Indiscriminate debt does not seem to 
matter for the CRT performance of high-income consumers. The performances on the CRT for both those 
in indiscriminate debt and those who are debt free follow negatively sloped curves. 
 
As debt is considered as overdraft, the same result obtained for indiscriminate debt 
appears. Table 6 allows one to make a direct comparison with the Germany study, which 
reports a negative relationship between performance on the CRT and overdraft debt. 
Unlike the Germany study, Figure 3 suggests there is no difference in CRT performance 
between those who use the overdraft service and those who do not. However, this still 
remains to be proved conclusively because the result is statistically nonsignificant. 
 
Table 6. Follow-up experiment: CRT scores, by overdraft debt 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
In debt? 0 1 2 3 
Yes29 48.2714 27.588 24.147 0.000 
No97 61.8560 25.7725 10.3110 2.062 
Notes:  
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents  
(2) 
2(3) 4.491; -value 0.213p   ( Fisher's exact -value 0.246p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.126; -value 0.161p     
 
 
Figure 3. Follow-up experiment: CRT scores and overdraft debt. Overdraft debt does not seem to matter 
for the CRT performance of high-income consumers. The performances on the CRT for both those in 
overdraft debt and those who are debt free follow negatively sloped curves. 
 
Figues 3 and 4 suggest that owing a debt does not matter for the CRT performance 
of high-income consumers, because the performances for both the indebted and the debt 
free follow negatively sloped curves. The fact that this visual inspection suggests a 
reverted pattern as one compares Figures 3-4 with Figure 1, we decided to go on and 
consider the new variable “overall debt” by merging the two kinds of debt considered 
here: indiscriminate and overdraft. This is justified because the previous results in Table 
5 and 6 are nonsignificant. Table 7 shows the findings for overall debt = indiscriminate 
debt   overdraft debt. Of note, there is significant reversion of the correlation, from 
negative to positive. 
 
Table 7. Follow-up experiment: CRT scores, by overall debt 
 Percentage scoring 0, 1, 2 or 3 
In debt? 0 1 2 3 
Yes11 36.364 27.273 36.364 0.000 
No115 60.8770 26.0830 11.3013 1.742 
Notes:  
(1) subscripts show the number of respondents 
(2) 
2(3) 5.896; -value 0.117p    ( Fisher's exact -value 0.364p  ) 
(3) Pearson's linear correlation 0.167; -value 0.062p    
 
 To reinforce the finding of reversion in the correlation between CRT performance 
and debt across the pilot and follow-up experiments, we adjusted regressions in the search 
for a best model. Table 8 shows CRT performance and indiscriminate debt in the pilot 
experiment are negatively correlated. The best model in Table 8 thus replicates the 
findings reported in Tables 1-3. 
 
 
Table 8. Best adjusted model for the pilot experiment 
Variable Estimate Standard error t ratio p-value 
Intercept 
 
1.785 0.1601 11.15 < 0.001 
Gender 
(1 = female; 0 = male) 
–0.822 0.1863 –4.47 < 0.001 
Indiscriminate debt 
(1 = yes; 0 = no) 
–0.319 0.1851 –1.72 0.087 
Note: 
(1) Overdraft debt was again nonsignificant 
 
 Strikingly, Table 9 shows the variables CRT performance and overall debt in the 
follow-up experiment become positively correlated. Moreover, the correlation 
coefficients in both Tables 8 and 9 are strong. 
 
Table 9. Best adjusted model for the follow-up experiment 
Variable Estimate Standard error t ratio p-value 
Intercept 
 
0.642 0.0869 7.40 < 0.001 
Gender 
(1 = female; 0 = male) 
–0.297 0.1426 –2.09 0.039 
Overall debt 
(1 = yes; 0 = no) 
0.519 0.2432 –2.14 0.035 
Note: 
(1) Overall debt = indiscriminate debt  overdraft debt 
 
 Of note, the estimates in Tables 8 and 9 show a low 
2R  and thus cannot be used 
for predicting. However, the results do establish a tendency between CRT performance 
and the regressors gender, indiscriminate debt and overdraft debt. The sample size is 
expected to be “large enough” to detect a difference if it exists. However, “large enough” 
does not necessarily mean a big sample. What matters is getting an amount of data that is 
sufficient enough to correctly reject a null hypothesis. Moreover, the probability of 
rejection in large samples tends to increase due to the power function of the test. 
Considering this fact, Fisher’s exact test was explicitly designed for small samples [30]. 
To sum up, those high-income consumers in overall debt do not show relatively 
poorer cognitive performance than those who are debt free. This suggests another cause 
for high-income consumer indebtness. When one does not discriminate consumers in 
terms of their incomes, consumers seem to contract debts due to lack of self control (poor 
cognitive reflection). This is what the Germany study finds. While that study remains 
valid (as our pilot experiment seems to suggest), when one focuses on high-income 
consumers (as in our follow-up experiment) consumer indebtness can no longer be 
explained by poor cognitive reflection. We speculate this may be explained by the fact 
that high-income consumers have higher financial literacy, and this is related to lower 
indebtdeness [31]. In the end, high-income consumers treat debt as mere leverage, as 
companies do. And banks seems to perceive that. The bank where the participants of our 
follow-up experiment came from definitely treats high-income consumers differently 
regarding overdraft debt. They usually wait until 10 business days have passed before 
beginning to charge the use of the overdraft service, a treatment similar to that dispensed 
to companies using working capital. Thus, banks sometimes consider overdraft debt of 
high-income consumers as leveraged loans. 
Polonius in Shakespeare’s Hamlet advises, “Neither a borrower nor a lender be.” 
Is that reasonable? Irving Fisher [32] thinks the correct advice should be: “Both a 
borrower and a lender be.” To buy a house one usually has to contract a huge debt 
(mortgage). However, contracting such a debt is a way to save resources for retirement. 
To get an academic degree that will increase one’s future income, one may contract a 
debt. Current debt is then justified when it translates into freeing up future resources and 
expanding opportunities. This type of debt is leverage. However, there is no guarantee 
that all motivations for leverage are related to such rational calculations. One may incur 
leverage motivated by overconfidence and excessive optimism, for example. Our study 




A recent study using massive data for Germany, where credit lines on current 
accounts are available to 80 percent of the population, finds that excessive usage of costly 
credit lines is more likely for people who give intuitive but incorrect answers on a 
cognitive reflection test. This suggests in-debt consumers who use overdraft services have 
poorer cognitive reflection and, thus, lack of self control. The Germany study finds that 
the level of income does not matter. Here, we discriminate consumers in terms of income. 
In a first (pilot) experiment we do not discriminate consumers considering their incomes 
as in the Germany study where income is not an issue. Overall, our pilot experiment 
replicates the finding of the Germany study. However, in a follow-up experiment using a 
high-quality sample of high-income consumers, we find debt can no longer be explained 
by poor cognitive reflection and lack of self control. Apparently, high-income consumers 
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